Αναζήτηση αυτού του ιστολογίου

Πέμπτη, 29 Δεκεμβρίου 2011

ΠΩΣ ΦΤΑΣΑΜΕ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΚΡΙΣΗ ;


  • The Wall Street Journal

Dithering at the Top Turned EU Crisis to Global Threat

At a closed-door meeting in Washington on April 14, Europe's effort to contain its debt crisis began to unravel.
Inside the French ambassador's 19-bedroom mansion, finance ministers and central bankers from the world's largest economies heard Dominique Strauss-Kahn, then-head of the International Monetary Fund, deliver an ultimatum.
[DisUnionLogo]
The Journal is examining how the euro-zone debt crisis is upending Europe's decades-long push toward deeper economic and political integration. See more in the series.
Greece, the country that triggered the euro-zone debt crisis, would need a much bigger bailout than planned, Mr. Strauss-Kahn said. Unless Europe coughed up extra cash, the IMF, which a year earlier had agreed to share the burden with European countries, wouldn't release any more aid for Athens.
The warning prompted a split among the euro zone's representatives over who should pay to save Greece from the biggest sovereign bankruptcy in history. European taxpayers alone? Or should the banks that had lent Greece too much during the global credit bubble also suffer?
The IMF didn't mind how Europe proceeded, as long as there was clarity by summer. "We need a decision," said Mr. Strauss-Kahn.
It was to be Europe's fateful spring. A Wall Street Journal investigation, based on more than two dozen interviews with euro-zone policy makers, revealed how the currency union floundered in indecision—failing to address either the immediate concerns of investors or the fundamental weaknesses undermining the euro. The consequence was that a crisis in a few small economies turned into a threat to the survival of Europe's common currency and a menace to the global economy.

Life in the Euro Zone

Hear six families -- from Greece, Spain, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands -- tell their stories.

Euro Zone Crisis Tracker

See economic, political and markets news from across Europe as governments and financial institutions deal with the continuing debt crisis.
In April, after a year of drama and bailouts, the euro zone seemed to have contained the immediate crisis to Greece and other small countries. Crucially, euro-zone economies such as Spain and Italy had avoided the panicked flight of capital. They were still able to borrow money at affordable rates in the bond market.
But by July, the rift among euro-zone leaders over who should bear the burden of Greece's debt had prompted investors to shun all financially fragile euro nations. Like a wildfire, the spreading uncertainty threatened to engulf the whole of Europe's indebted south, to outstrip the resources of its richer north and to burn down the symbol of Europe's dream of unity, its single currency.
Now, as the bloc's leaders rush to forge a closer political union, the lesson of that period looms large. Investor trust in public debt is part of the foundation on which all nation-states depend. And in Europe's common currency—a unique experiment with the livelihoods of 330 million people—nations will win or lose that trust together.
The dispute at the Washington meeting divided two of the Continent's grand old men, both of them born in 1942 and both among the fathers of the euro.
Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany's ascetic and irascible finance minister, understood the IMF's ultimatum. The euro zone would have to draw up a second bailout package for Greece by summer, just a year after a loan deal for €110 billion, or $140 billion.
But this time, Mr. Schäuble said, "We cannot just buy out the private investors" with taxpayer money. That would reward reckless lending, he said, and it would never get through an increasingly impatient German parliament. Greece's bondholders would be required to lend more money, Mr. Schäuble proposed, rather than take payment for their bonds at maturity.
Jean-Claude Trichet, the urbane French head of the European Central Bank, warned against forcing bondholders to put in more money, which would effectively delay repayment. "This is not a good way to go in a monetary union," Mr. Trichet said. "Investors would avoid all euro-area bonds."
Mr. Trichet, in the twilight of a 36-year career as a finance official, feared that if Greece didn't honor its bond debts on time, the implicit trust that kept credit flowing to many weak euro-zone governments would shatter. More countries and their banks would lose access to capital markets, in a chain reaction with incalculable consequences.
The April meeting ended inconclusively.
Meanwhile, the cost for fixing Greece was rising. The Athens government's budget deficit was stuck at a stubbornly high level.
BRINK-bottom
BRINK-top
Italian and Spanish borrowing costs were still affordable and stable. The yield on Spain's 10-year bonds hovered around 5.3%; on Italy's, around 4.6%.
The debate over making bondholders contribute to the new funding package for Greece—known as private-sector involvement, or PSI—divided euro-zone countries.
Germany had allies. In the Netherlands and Finland, new governments had promised voters they wouldn't pay for problems in less-frugal Mediterranean countries. Breaking those promises would risk rebellions in parliament.
But France joined the ECB in resisting burden-sharing by bondholders. France's banks had lent more heavily than Germany's to Greece and other indebted euro nations, and France fretted about a Lehman Brothers-style banking-system meltdown. Italian officials also feared that a precedent for losses in Greece would scare investors away from Italy's bonds.
Three weeks after the Washington gathering, on Friday, May 6, panic erupted. German news weekly Der Spiegel reported that Greece was thinking of leaving the euro zone, with policy makers heading to a secret meeting that night in Luxembourg.
The report was half-right. There was a meeting, but Greece was staying put.
Inside a country chateau, top euro-zone officials told Greece's finance minister they expected deeper austerity and faster reforms in return for a new aid package.
Then Mr. Schäuble said he wanted to discuss how bondholder burden-sharing would work. The usually smooth-mannered Mr. Trichet lost his patience. "I want to put my position on the record," he said: "I don't agree with private-sector involvement, so I won't take part in a discussion about the practicalities." He stormed out.
Mr. Trichet's assent was vital. If the ECB were to stop accepting Greek bonds as collateral for its lending to banks on the grounds that the bonds were in default, then Greece's banks, which were stuffed full of their government's bonds, would quickly run out of cash and collapse. That would radically drive up the cost of a rescue.
In Greece, a new wave of mass strikes and demonstrations was starting. Protesters, angry about Europe's imposition of extra spending cuts and tax hikes, clashed with police in front of the Athens parliament in the biggest and most violent protests in a year.
Spanish and Italian bond prices remained stable. But Europe was at a dangerous impasse over Greece.
Many euro-zone governments hoped Mr. Strauss-Kahn could find a way to relax the IMF's summer deadline. The IMF chief was due to discuss the matter with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on May 15, and with euro-zone finance ministers in Brussels the next day.
Mr. Strauss-Kahn couldn't attend. Police in New York pulled him off his Paris-bound flight and charged him with sexually assaulting a hotel chambermaid. (The charges were later dropped, and prosecutors said they doubted the maid's reliability.) An aide phoned Ms. Merkel at her central-Berlin home that Saturday and told her the news. The astonished chancellor responded with a German idiom that translates roughly as: "You couldn't make this up."
The IMF sent a lower-ranking official to Brussels in his place who had no latitude to deviate from the IMF's deadline.
In Athens, meanwhile, a tent city of the "Indignant" protest movement—a groundswell of anger at the country's impoverishment—sprang up outside parliament. Spain's bond prices began to wobble as investors worried that other countries might also face debt restructuring.
On June 1, Mr. Schäuble's deputy, Jörg Asmussen, presented a German plan at a meeting of finance officials in Vienna, at the Hofburg palace of the former Habsburg emperors. It involved pressuring Greece's bondholders to swap their Greek debt for new IOUs that would come due far in the future. That would cut the amount of European taxpayer funding Greece would need.
After a meal in a palace banquet hall, the officials quarreled into the wee hours.
For the ECB, Mr. Trichet's deputy Vitor Constâncio, of Portugal, denounced the German plan as "dangerous." Credit-rating agencies would declare Greece to be in default on some of its debts—a so-called selective default. In that case, Mr. Constâncio warned, the ECB would refuse to accept Greek government bonds as collateral, dealing a death blow to Greek banks. France, Italy and Spain all supported Mr. Constâncio.
Germany's Mr. Asmussen shot back with a threat of his own. Europe needed Germany's money to fund a new program of Greek loans. "Without private-sector involvement," he said, "there will be no program."
Greece was descending into chaos. Embattled premier George Papandreou's slender majority in parliament was fraying. On June 15, a swelling demonstration in Athens's central square veered out of control.
Alone in his office, Mr. Papandreou phoned the parliamentary opposition leader and offered to make way for a national-unity government. Talks broke down, and the Greek government limped on badly wounded.
Even Ms. Merkel had some doubts about her finance ministry's hard-line insistence that Greece's bondholders take a loss. On June 17, she discussed a softer plan with French President Nicolas Sarkozy: a gentleman's agreement under which Greek bonds would be honored but the bondholders would volunteer to buy new ones.
Mr. Schäuble pushed back. The veteran conservative politician was Berlin's biggest supporter of the European dream, but he was also the keeper of Germany's purse. He was determined to make banks share the burden with German taxpayers, and he didn't trust them to keep a gentleman's agreement.
When finance ministers met again on June 20, Mr. Schäuble pushed harder. Greece's bondholders should be told not merely to accept a delay in repayment, he said, but also to forgive some Greek debt—a so-called haircut.
As Greece's economy moved toward free fall, its debts were soaring beyond the country's ability to pay, the Germans and their northern allies argued. Mr. Trichet and the southern countries resisted. Talks dragged on for hours. The ministers knew they couldn't leave without some agreement.
They tried to please everyone: Greece would get more aid. Bondholder losses would be substantial, to placate the Germans, Dutch and Finns. But as the ECB insisted, they would avoid pushing Greece into selective default.
Investors knew you couldn't have it both ways. As the threat of a Greek debt restructuring sank in, Southern Europe's bond markets grew volatile. Spain's 10-year bond yield rose above 5.6%. Italy's reached 4.9%.
Greece's parliament debated the extra austerity measures that Europe demanded. Central Athens erupted in violent protests. Anarchist youths tore up chunks of paving stone and threw them at riot police, who fired back with tear gas and stun grenades. Café parasols burned.
Europe hadn't resolved how to keep Greece afloat. The IMF—whose demand for a decision had set off the whole argument—softened its ultimatum. IMF officials said they were satisfied that Europe would sort out some kind of new bailout, and wired Greece its summer aid payment on July 8.
It wasn't enough to calm markets. Spain's bond yield hit 6.3%. Italy's rose to over 5.8%. Such borrowing costs, if sustained, would make it hard for both countries to rein in their debts.
The selloff in bond markets forced leaders to call an emergency summit for July 21.
Determined not to let the summit pass without an agreement, Ms. Merkel invited the French president, who objected to the German push for bondholder losses, to Berlin. The pair and their advisers met for dinner in the German chancellery the night before the meeting.
Few of them had time to touch the duck breast and vegetables on their plates as they searched for a compromise. Finally, Mr. Sarkozy said he would accept the private-sector involvement—if Ms. Merkel dropped her resistance to giving the euro-zone bailout fund broad new powers to buy debt of weak countries directly and move to protect such countries as Spain and Italy from bond-market contagion. Ms. Merkel agreed.
One more person needed to sign off. Ms. Merkel phoned Mr. Trichet at his Frankfurt office. He took the last Lufthansa flight to Berlin and arrived at the chancellery around 10 p.m.
Reluctantly, Mr. Trichet gave his OK. But he set conditions. Governments would have to insure Greek bonds against default so that the ECB could continue to accept them as collateral. And they would have to make plain that no other euro country but Greece would have its debts restructured.
The trio's deal was both complicated and vague. Their staffs had little time to flesh out details before the next day's summit in Brussels. As leaders trickled into the European Union's boxy headquarters, Ms. Merkel faced a challenge to placate the euro zone's south, which thought private-sector involvement was dangerous, and its north, which thought it didn't go far enough.
When the leaders assembled at the sprawling summit table, Ms. Merkel admitted that the specter of bondholder losses was causing market unrest. But, she said, some Greek debt relief was essential. Without it, the bailout's tough austerity conditions—made tougher by Greece's missing its budget goals—would be seen as unbearable.
"If Greece had met its program parameters in April," she snapped, "that would have helped."
All 17 euro nations had to agree to private-sector involvement. But presented with a calculation that the plan would reduce Greece's debt by only about €19 billion out of more than €350 billion total, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte balked. If it's only €19 billion, he said, "I'm out. I need more."
Finnish premier Jyrki Katainen also complained. His parliament wanted collateral in exchange for more Finnish lending to Greece. "No collateral, no agreement from me," he said.
Mr. Sarkozy was peeved. "All our parliaments can cause problems," he said.
Then it was Slovakia's turn. Prime Minister Iveta Radičová was fighting to keep her coalition together over aid for Greece—a richer country than her own. Adding more powers to the bailout fund "would be suicide," she said.
Greece's Mr. Papandreou pleaded for help. "If we can't solve even Greece, we won't be seen as being able to solve anything else," he said.
Hours later, the leaders had a communiqué. To appease the holdouts, it left key points broad and noncommittal, offering the possibility of collateral to Finland and describing the complex bondholder deal in a few strokes, vague language that would return to haunt the bloc.
Officials struggled to explain the new Greek bailout and the bondholder losses. Amid the confusion, Mr. Rutte dispensed muddled numbers. Bank analysts put out flawed reports.
Investor confidence faltered as it became clear that Europe's compromise achieved the worst of all worlds. Greece would be pushed into a historic default—the first time in nearly 60 years that a developed, Western country wouldn't honor its debts. But the default was so small that Greece was still left with a crushing debt burden.
And then official Europe went on vacation: Ms. Merkel to the Italian Alps, Mr. Sarkozy to the French Riviera.
Bondholders didn't. They went on a rampage.
—Stephen Fidler, David Gauthier-Villars, Sudeep Reddy and Brian Blackstone contributed to this article.
Write to Charles Forelle at charles.forelle@wsj.com and Marcus Walker at marcus.walker@wsj.com

Τετάρτη, 28 Δεκεμβρίου 2011

Education and training | EACEA

Education and training | EACEA:

'via Blog this'

European Commission - First Quadriennial report of the European Union on the implementation of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions

European Commission - First Quadriennial report of the European Union on the implementation of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions: European Commission - First Quadriennial report of the European Union on the implementation of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions

European Commission -

European Commission -: European Commission -

Πρώτο ΘΕΜΑ online : Μαμούθ το κοίτασμα στην Κύπρο, αξίας έως 90 δισ. δολαρίων - Ελλάδα

Πρώτο ΘΕΜΑ online : Μαμούθ το κοίτασμα στην Κύπρο, αξίας έως 90 δισ. δολαρίων - Ελλάδα

Τρίτη, 27 Δεκεμβρίου 2011


The Third International Conference on Nordic and Baltic Studies of the Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies and Balkanalysis.com will be held from
May 25-27, 2012
in Targoviste, Romania

European networks:
the Balkans, Scandinavia and the Baltic world in a time of economic and ideological crisis

Conference General Topic Description: The current global economic crisis has generated debate in Europe regarding not only the future expansion of the EU, but the very viability of the European project itself. The discussion regarding the integration of the Balkans in the EU or NATO has been accompanied or even replaced by the question of whether the European project will in fact survive the general economic and social crisis that Europe faces today. While the Balkans still look towards Western European models and standards, Europe itself is suffering a crisis of political deadlock, economic decline, and an increasingly sharp ideological divide. Similarly, while Estonia has just entered the Euro club and Latvian, Lithuanian, Bulgarian and Romanian leaders talk about joining into the Euro zone, top world economists are at the same time predicting the end of the Euro as a currency sometime in the near future.
The economic crisis in Europe seems to be partially responsible for the adoption over the past few years of anti-immigrant policies, something also being fed by fears of the future role of Islam in Europe. But these policies have also targeted citizens of European Union countries in Central and Eastern Europe (such as the Roma minority in Romania), as well as those of non-EU Balkan states.
A common reason stated for exclusionary policies is to safeguard the jobs of domestic workers. However, this crisis has also fostered the development of a new far right bloc around Europe, having as one of its features the exaltation of xenophobia, fear of immigrants and foreigners in general. The debate regarding the Roma has been particularly fierce, with even the Finns and the Swedes opposed to the formers’ presence in their countries. A transformative moment in the evolution of this phenomenon occurred in July of 2011, with the Oslo attacks carried out by Anders Behring Breivik, allegedly done to save Norwegian society from the government’s liberal policies on immigration and multi-culturalism. Disturbingly, this event proved that even advanced and well-organized European states such as Norway are unable to prevent large-scale extremist violence.

The aims of the conference:The conference has two major goals. The first is to foster debate and academic discussion regarding contemporary problems facing the Balkan and Baltic regions during a period of severe global economic instability. These include the rise of extremist political groups with violent aims in the Baltics, the continued activity of Balkan-origin organized crime groups in Scandinavia, and the role that Baltic states may play in helping Western Balkan countries integrate politically and institutionally with the EU. The second aim of the conference is to foster cooperation and the creation of research networks between scholars from two geographical peripheries of Europe.

In this respect, the conference will address themes such as:

  • The accession of Balkan states to the EU and/or NATO, with particular reference to the experiences of the relatively new EU and/or NATO Member States from South-Eastern Europe and the Eastern Baltic region. What lessons or information-sharing experiences or networks do the latter states have for the Balkan ones?

  • Perceived threats to Western Europe (in economic, security or cultural terms) posed by Balkan and/or Eastern European states/non-state actors. Are these threats real or exaggerated? What measures can and are being taken to deal with them?

  • The development of the far right in the Balkans and in Northern Europe, past, present and future. What linkages can be observed, and what conclusions can be made?

  • Strategies for integrating minorities in the Baltic Sea rim countries and in the Black Sea areas. What is being done, and how can it be done better?

  • Past and present networks of cooperation at state or NGO level between the Baltic and Black seas regions. Do these present a useful model for results-oriented cooperation (ie., in sharing experiences for EU membership goals), or otherwise how should they be modified?

  • Current economic relations between Baltic and/or Nordic states, on the one hand, and the Balkan countries, on the other: trends and directions of trade between the two regions, labor costs and competitiveness, business perceptions, economic integration etc.

  • Current political, cultural and diplomatic relations between Baltic and/or Nordic states, on the one hand, and the Balkan countries;

  • Balkan organized crime in the Scandinavian countries

  • The Balkan Roma people as threat for Western Europe

The second aim of the conference is to foster cooperation and the creation of research networks between scholars from two geographical peripheries of Europe, the Balkans and the Baltic World. This conference aims at putting this people together, at facilitating the contacts among them, at offering them the framework for developing new projects, for finding in cooperation new solutions to old dilemmas. Creating specialized networks is indeed an implicit aim of every international conference, but this would be the first organized event specifically designed to bring together scholars, academics, PhD students from the Balkans and Baltic world or interested in the problems of these two specific areas.
ARSBN welcomes papers, panels and roundtable proposals. Contributions are encouraged from disciplines but not limited to: history, cultural studies, economics, ethnic relations, international relations, political science.

Paper, panel or roundtable proposals shall be send to the organizers of the conference at conference2012@arsbn.ro and must include an abstract (motivation, problem statement, approach, results, conclusion) of no more than 300 words and a curriculum vitae.

All participants whose papers are accepted for presentation will be offered free conference attendance, accommodation and an excursion. Please be aware that the travel expenses are not covered except for a few possible travel grants offered by the Nordic and Baltic embassies in Romania (the confirmation of which is still pending). However, the participants arriving from abroad will be commuted from and to Bucharest International Airport “Henri Coanda” (some 75 km east to Targoviste).

Selected papers presented at the conference will be published in the journals: • Revista Româna de Studii Baltice si Nordice / The Romanian Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies: http://www.arsbn.ro/RRSBN.htm - deadline June  15, 2011
• Valahian Journal of Historical Studies: 
http://www.valahianjournal.info – deadline September 15, 2012;
In addition, the possibility of publishing a thematic volume at Cambridge Scholars Publishing is also envisaged.

Conference Schedule and Deadlines:• Proposals for panels and roundtables (approx. 500 words): December 31, 2011
• Abstracts for individual papers (approx. 300 words): February 1, 2012
• Notification of Acceptance: March 1, 2012
• Publication of the Conference program: March 31, 2012
• Conference: May 25-27, 2012

Conference organizers (others still to confirm):

The Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies 
Balkanalysis.com 

Embassy of Finland, Bucharest 

Embassy of Lithuania, Bucharest 

Embassy of Norway, Bucharest 

Consulate of Latvia, Bucharest 


Consulate of Estonia, Bucharest 


Valahia University of Târgoviste 

"Grigore Gafencu" Research Center for the History of International Relations and Cultural Studies 


The Târgoviste Municipality 


The Royal Court National Museal Complex, Targoviste 

Cetatea de Scaun Printing House

Cambridge Scholars Publishing


Sponsor (others still to confirm):Niro Investment Group 


Organizing Committee:Honorary Chair of the Organizing Committee:
H.E. Dr. Vladimir Jarmolenko, Ambassador of Lithuania, The Honorary President of the Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies;

Chairs of the Organizing Committee:
Dr. Silviu Miloiu, The President of the Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies;
Chris Deliso, The Director of  Balkanalysis.com;

Members of the Organizing Committee (others still to confirm):

Dr. Kari Alenius, University of Oulu (Finland)
Ambassador Darko Angelov (Macedonia)
Dr. Florin Anghel, Ovidius University of Constanta (Romania)
Dr. Nerijus Babinskas, University of Vilnius (Lithuania)
Dr. Stefan Ewert, University of Greifswald (Germany)
Prof. Kristian Gerner, Lund University (Sweden)
Prof. Eriks Jekabsons, University of Latvia (Latvia)
Prof. Adrian Mac Liman; Ciencias Sociales Mundo Mediterráneo Foundation, Altea, Alicante (Spain)
Dr. Abel Polese, Institute of Governance, Tallinn University (Estonia)
Prof. Sara Núñez de Prado, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos (Spain)
Dr. Bogdan Schipor, "A.D. Xenopol" Institute of History of Iasi (Romania)
Prof. Panos Sophoulis, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens (Greece)
Islam Yusufi, Center for Policy Studies, Budapest (Hungary)

Secretary of the Organizing Committee:Elena Dragomir, The Secretary of The Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies

Keynote speakers (others still to confirm):

Prof. Michael North, University of Greifswald
Reinventing the Baltic Sea Region: From the Hansa to the EU-Strategy of 2009

The webpage of the conferencehttp://www.arsbn.ro/conference-2012.htm
Past conferences: http://www.arsbn.ro/conferences.htm andhttp://www.arsbn.ro/conference-2011.htm

Contact information:For further assistance, please contact the organizers of the conference at:
Postal address: Dr. Silviu Miloiu, Valahia University, Lt. Stancu Ion St., No. 34, 130105 Targoviste, Romania
Tel. (004) 0724403094, Fax  (004) 0345 819714, E-mail:
conference2012@arsbn.ro

Download the call for papers: Baltic and Nordic Conference 2012.pdf

S & U 2010 : First International Conference on Language, Literature and Cultural Studies The Said and the Unsaid

S & U 2010 : First International Conference on Language, Literature and Cultural Studies The Said and the Unsaid

ARC 28. 2013 : ARC Issue 28.1 CfP: Archaeology and Cultural Mixture: Creolization, hybridity and mestizaje

ARC 28. 2013 : ARC Issue 28.1 CfP: Archaeology and Cultural Mixture: Creolization, hybridity and mestizaje

EBSN Conference 2012 : Inaugural Conference of the European Beat Studies Network

EBSN Conference 2012 : Inaugural Conference of the European Beat Studies Network

Science and Science Fiction Conference 2012 : Science and Science Fiction Conference: When Worlds Collide: Science, Faith, and the Imagination

Science and Science Fiction Conference 2012 : Science and Science Fiction Conference: When Worlds Collide: Science, Faith, and the Imagination

Northeastern EGSA Conference 2012 : Memory Remains -- Graduate Student Conference -- Northeastern University EGSA

Northeastern EGSA Conference 2012 : Memory Remains -- Graduate Student Conference -- Northeastern University EGSA

ADES 2012 : II. International Symposium on Asian Languages and Literatures

ADES 2012 : II. International Symposium on Asian Languages and Literatures

Comparative Literature Papers 2012 : UC Berkeley--Comparative Literature Papers--Deadline Jan. 16

Comparative Literature Papers 2012 : UC Berkeley--Comparative Literature Papers--Deadline Jan. 16

Fastitocalon 2012 : Humour and the Fantastic

Fastitocalon 2012 : Humour and the Fantastic

CHUSER 2012 : IEEE Colloquium on Humanities, Science and Engineering

CHUSER 2012 : IEEE Colloquium on Humanities, Science and Engineering

WHF 2011 : 1st World Humanities Forum

WHF 2011 : 1st World Humanities Forum

MEDIASCAPE 2012 : History and Technology in Cinema, Media, and Visual Culture - MEDIASCAPE Journal

MEDIASCAPE 2012 : History and Technology in Cinema, Media, and Visual Culture - MEDIASCAPE Journal

Moving Forward 2012 : The Use, Misuse and Abuse of Identity

Moving Forward 2012 : The Use, Misuse and Abuse of Identity

Akademeia 2012 : [Akademeia] Multidisciplinary Peer-Reviewed Journal - Call for papers (Submit for next issue by 05-31-12)

Akademeia 2012 : [Akademeia] Multidisciplinary Peer-Reviewed Journal - Call for papers (Submit for next issue by 05-31-12)

Παρασκευή, 23 Δεκεμβρίου 2011

National Council for Culture to be founded in Paraguay - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

National Council for Culture to be founded in Paraguay - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

New educational initiative aims to ignite social action by connecting Canadian students, authors and books - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

New educational initiative aims to ignite social action by connecting Canadian students, authors and books - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

Cultural Policy 2011 - 2016 of Chile delivered to the president - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

Cultural Policy 2011 - 2016 of Chile delivered to the president - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

Year of Creative Scotland 2012 - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

Year of Creative Scotland 2012 - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

Book2 helps writers deliver their second book - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

Book2 helps writers deliver their second book - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

Ministry of Culture says that use of assigned expenditure will exceed 80% - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

Ministry of Culture says that use of assigned expenditure will exceed 80% - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

Shake-up for arts funding council - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

Shake-up for arts funding council - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

7th Conference of OIC Culture and Information Ministers Concluded in Algiers - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

7th Conference of OIC Culture and Information Ministers Concluded in Algiers - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

European Union proposes world's largest ever cultural funding programme - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

European Union proposes world's largest ever cultural funding programme - IFACCA, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies

Σάββατο, 17 Δεκεμβρίου 2011

Ο ΠΑΝ. ΜΠΟΣΝΑΚΗΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΟΝ ΘΑΝΑΤΟ ΤΟΥ CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS

ΠΕΘΑΝΕ ΜΙΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΙΣ ΠΛΕΟΝ ΑΝΤΙΦΑΤΙΚΕΣ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΙΚΟΤΗΤΕΣ, Ο ΒΡΕΤΑΝΟΣ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΟΓΡΑΦΟΣ ΚΡΙΣΤΟΦΕΡ ΧΙΤΣΕΝΣ \ Υπέκυψε ο πολέμιος των τυράννων

"O Kρίστοφερ Χίτσενς ήταν μία μεγάλη προσωπικότητα του Αμερικανικού Τύπου και σημαντικός φίλος της χώρας μας. Ο ξαφνικός θάνατός του συνιστά τεράστια απώλεια για τον Ελληνισμό και τα δίκαια της Κύπρου. Ασυμβίβαστος, φιλελεύθερος, προοδευτικός, πολέμησε για το δίκαιο των μικρών λαών με πάθος και αυταπάρνηση. Χαίρομαι που τον γνώρισα αν και την μοναδική φορά που ετοιμάζαμε μία ομιλία του για το Πανεπιστήμιο του Μισσούρι δεν τελεσφόρησε λόγω φόρτου εργασίας έκ μέρους του."  Πάνος Μποσνάκης

Τετάρτη, 14 Δεκεμβρίου 2011

ΟΜΙΛΙΑ ΠΑΝ. ΜΠΟΣΝΑΚΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΑΙΘΟΥΣΑ ΤΟΥ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΙΚΟΥ ΚΟΙΝΟΒΟΥΛΙΟΥ ΣΤΟ ΠΛΑΙΣΙΟ ΗΜΕΡΙΔΑΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΗ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ "ΕΛΛΑΔΑ-ΚΥΠΡΟΣ-ΙΣΡΑΗΛ ΣΤΟ ΝΕΟ ΓΕΩΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟ ΠΕΡΙΒΑΛΛΟΝ ΚΑΙ Η ΑΝΑΓΚΗ ΣΥΓΚΡΟΤΗΣΗΣ ΜΙΑΣ ΝΕΑΣ ΑΝΤΙΛΗΨΗΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΗ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ"

Ο Παν. Μποσνάκης θα μιλήσει σήμερα 15 Δεκεμβρίου 2011 στην Αίθουσα του Ευρωπαικού Κοινοβουλίου στα πλαίσια ημερίδας με θέμα "Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική: Προσαρμογή στρατηγικής και θεσμικών οργάνων"  που οργανώνουν οι μη κυβερνητικές οργανώσεις JEF και InetCosmos από τις 3.30 - 7.30 μμ στο κτίριο του Ευρωπαικού Κοινοβουλίου Λ. Αμαλίας 8 - Ξενοφώντος απέναντι από τον Εθνικό κήπο. 

Το θέμα της εισήγησης του Π. Μποσνάκη είναι "Ελλάδα-Κύπρος-Ισραήλ στο νέο γεωπολιτικό περιβάλλον και η ανάγκη συγκρότησης μίας νέας αντίληψης για την Ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική". Στην ομιλία του ο Παν. Μποσνάκης θα αναφερθεί στις δυνατότητες και την δυναμική μίας στρατηγικής συνεργασίας ανάμεσα στην Ελλάδα, την Κύπρο και το Ισραήλ, τον ρόλο της Ελλάδος στην Μέση Ανατολή, την Ανατ. Μεσόγειο και την Ευρασία, την πολιτική των πετρελαίων και της ενέργειας, τον τρόπο προσέγγισης και συνεργασίας με την Εβραική Διασπορά στις ΗΠΑ και την ΕΕ, τον αναβαθμισμένο ρόλο της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας στην Ευρώπη και τον εκσυγχρονισμό της εξωτερικής πολιτικής από το ΥΠΕΞ με νέες προτεραιότητες.


Η είσοδος είναι ελεύθερη για το κοινό. 


Σάββατο, 10 Δεκεμβρίου 2011

ΔΩΡΕΑΝ ΕΙΣΗΤΗΡΙΑ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΣΥΝΑΥΛΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΣΥΝΟΛΟΥ DISSONART ΓΙΑ ΤΟ ΙΑΝΝΗ ΞΕΝΑΚΗ


  • Στέγη Γραμμάτων και Τεχνών – Ίδρυμα Ωνάση
Στις 14 Δεκεμβρίου στη συναυλία του συνόλου DissonART αφιερωμένη στον Ιάννη Ξενάκη (δέκα χρόνια μετά τον θάνατο του) θα υπάρχουν 200 θέσεις δωρεάν, με σειρά προτεραιότητας στα τηλέφωνα 210 9005800 και 2130178036.